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ABSTRACT 
The ‘Golden Age’ refers to an era of rapid economic growth which led to dramatic 
changes within European society. The steady rise in income coupled with recently 
introduced paid holidays encouraged the new middle classes to emulate the lifestyle of 
the glamorous and privileged trendsetters of the Belle Époque and the 1920s. The 
outward trappings of this included the purchase of a car and annual holidays in the 
Mediterranean, amounting in the 1950s to a sort of yearly pilgrimage. In the Balearic 
Islands and the Costa Brava an ample tourist sector flourished against a political 
background that was essentially in opposition to it – the autarchic stage of the Franco 
regime. Tourism, in the end, became one of the determining factors which provoked 
radical changes to this regime, leading eventually to complete abandonment of its 
militant isolationism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the beginning of the 1950s Western Europe as a whole witnessed a period of rapid 
growth, a veritable Golden Age, while Spain languished in a particularly deep economic 
depression, so severe that the years immediately preceding are recalled in most parts of 
the country as the ‘Years of Hunger’ (Arco 2006). As will be seen, inbound tourism 
proved crucial to launching the Spanish recovery in a twofold manner. In the first place, 
it served as a link between Europe’s thriving economies and Spain’s moribund one; 
throughout this decade tourist spending became an invaluable source of foreign 
currency for the nation. Secondly, the sheer number of tourists overwhelmed the 
capacity of Franco’s regime to deal with them, creating serious ideological 
contradictions and also helping to disrupt and dismantle the fragile economic structure 
on which the new state was attempting to base itself. 
The present work is, therefore, dual in a double sense. At the geographical level we 
shall examine a market whose demand lay in Western Europe, above all France, 
followed by the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries and Germany, while the 
supply lay in Francoist Spain. There is, however, another duality in our analysis, as we 
will be looking simultaneously at economic development and tourism. The latter is 
more complex, while the first – European and Spanish economic development in the 
1950s – has produced a vast literature among historians. Tourism, by contrast, has 
barely been addressed. 
Beside the data contained in this article, we shall be presenting several new factors 
which help explain the progress of the Spanish economy during those vital early years 
of spectacular economic growth, which culminated in Spain’s entrance into the 
European Union. We shall also be examining the origins and early development of an 
industry that ended up becoming the leading sector in the national economy. Spain is 
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now by far the leader of the Mediterranean tourist market, with five Spanish hotel 
companies currently among the fifty largest in the world. 1 
With regard to Europe, our analysis of visitors coming to Spain will help to show 
how tourism evolved between the 1930s and the 1950s, developing from an exclusive 
activity reserved for the privileged few into a true mass phenomenon enjoyed by the 
new middle classes, who converted their annual Mediterranean holiday into a veritable 
social hallmark. 
 
 
2. THE UPSURGE OF TOURISM AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
 
While the Industrial Revolution changed methods of production and created new social 
groupings such as entrepreneurial mill-owners and workers, it also caused changes in 
the privileged echelons of society who stood outside the new economic framework, but 
still received a substantial portion of the additional income it generated. No one has 
described the new state of affairs better than Schumpeter: 
“The king, the court, the army, the church and the bureaucracy lived to an 
increasing extent on revenue created by the capitalist process, even purely feudal 
sources of income being swelled in consequence of contemporaneous capitalist 
developments.” (Schumpeter 2003: 136). 
 
These privileged individuals, mostly members of the aristocracy and not involved in 
economic activity of any kind, found tourism to be the perfect leisure pursuit to display 
their elevated social rank. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, as 
trains and steamers improved steadily and transport networks expanded and were linked 
to one another, the journey abroad became a comfortable and regular activity (Böröcz, 
1992:712). It was eagerly pursued by the British upper classes who, by the end of the 
century, had already become the “travelling classes” (Pemble 1988: 1).  
The holiday format for this privileged minority changed over time, initially based 
around indoor hot-water spas and bathing resorts by chilly seas. As the twentieth 
century progressed, however, scientific advances undermined medical beliefs on which 
these traditional holiday centres had been set up, favouring instead direct exposure of 
                                                        
1
  According to rankings compiled by Hotels magazine in 2014, five Spanish companies featured among 
the 50 largest hotel companies in the world. These were Meliá, NH, Riu, Barceló and Iberostar, all of 
them Majorcan except the second, based in Madrid. 
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the body to the sun (Hunt et al. 2012; Kevan 1993; Tubergen and Linden 2002). Thanks 
to this paradigm shift in medical and social practice, the period between the wars saw 
the Mediterranean beach enshrined as the new object of desire for European tourists. 
As occurs with any emerging market, increasing demand saw a rise in provision, and 
thus a whole new business sector appeared. In the United Kingdom Thomas Cook was 
the pioneer who sold the first all-inclusive tourist packages (Simmons 1973), while in 
Belgium the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits was born, and in Germany 
Baedecker began to publish his tourist guides. The receiving countries were mainly 
Switzerland, France and Italy, and in all three a wide-ranging hotel industry was 
established whose infrastructure necessitated substantial investment. 
The processes of social diffusion quickly spread the taste for leisure travel far and 
wide, first from Great Britain to the other ruling classes in Europe, then to the emerging 
middle classes, and finally in the 1930s to skilled workers in Britain and France 
(Furlough 1998; Pope 2001; Walton 1981; 2011). Shortly before the outbreak of the 
World War II paid annual holidays began to be established legally, although the process 
was not consolidated as a right for all employees until after the War (Cross 1989; 
Hubermann and Minns 2007). In 1950, workers in France and Germany already enjoyed 
an average of four weeks’ annual leave, which was slightly less in the case of Great 
Britain (Jones 1986: 332). 
At first Spain stood on the periphery of these social trends, appearing timidly in the 
European tourist firmament only at the very end of the nineteenth century, as 
demonstrated by the late publication of the original Baedeker guide to Spain and 
Portugal (1898). At that period only the city of Malaga attracted a considerable number 
of foreign visitors – the sick and infirm fleeing wet British winters and travellers 
seduced by the Orientalist myth of the Spanish south, disseminated by authors like 
Washington Irving and Prosper Mérimée (Barke, Mowl and Shields 2010). To the 
Andalusian city was soon added Palma de Mallorca, where the period 1900–1910 saw 
the construction of several distinguished hotels which aspired to compete with Nice; 
this initiative did not meet with the hoped-for success, but the new-born tourist sector 
on Majorca managed to survive by redirecting its commercial energies to the middle (as 
opposed to luxury) sector of the tourist market (Cirer 2012). 
During the 1920s new hotels with international tourism in mind rose in both Malaga 
and Palma de Mallorca, but the onset of the Great Depression and the declaration of the 
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Second Republic in 1931 drastically reduced the volume of tourists arriving in the 
Iberian peninsula. Only in the Balearic Islands did the situation improve, but it was 
much more than that – between 1930 and 1935 the archipelago enjoyed a massive 
tourist boom. In just five years the number of hotels in Majorca grew from 88 to 135, 
while tourist numbers doubled, reaching 40,000 per year (Cirer 2014). Majorca’s tourist 
surge spilled over to the island of Ibiza, where 1933 saw the opening of hotels directed 
at foreign tourists – and even to Formentera. 
In the previous paragraphs we have referred solely to international tourism, but in 
Spain there were also flows of domestic tourism, in this case, with their epicentre on the 
Cantabrian coastline. San Sebastián had begun its tourist development in the mid-
nineteenth century and within a short time had set its sights on becoming the holiday 
capital of Spain. It was followed by the nearby city of Santander, thanks to the 
pioneering initiative of the Pombo family, who furnished the city with its first top-class 
hotels and in the early twentieth century succeeded in bringing Spain’s royal family to 
its beaches at El Sardinero (Walton and Smith 1994: 27). For both cities the clientele 
came essentially from Madrid, but San Sebastian alone managed to attract a small quota 
of foreign tourists (Shelmerdine 2003: 73). Within Spain’s domestic market, the second 
most important source of tourists was the city of Barcelona, whose wealthiest residents 
could afford to build second homes on the Costa Brava or at Sitges south of Barcelona, 
while the new middle classes generally opted for the nearby island of Majorca (Farreras 
1973; Priestley 1984). 
 
 
3. THE ‘GOLDEN AGE’ AND SPAIN’S AUTRACHIC PERIOD 
 
The first key concept to be considered is the ‘Golden Age’ itself, a period whose initial 
phase is linked to the reconstruction that followed on from the disaster of World War II, 
with some countries reaching particularly high levels of growth (Crafts and Mills 1996: 
425; Vonyó 2008: 235). Thanks to this phenomenon, GDP per capita enjoyed continual 
growth throughout the period. Between 1950 and 1959 it attained an annual average of 
3.4% in real terms, and in France and Germany reached the extraordinary annual 
average of 7.1%. Great Britain grew more modestly, at 1.9% per annum, but as it started 
out from a stronger position it still maintained economic leadership among these three 
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nations, retaining a high capacity for sending tourists abroad (Crafts 1995: 435; 
Maddison 2003). Of particular concern to us is data relating to wages and salaries, 
which in real terms, did not rise quite as fast (Eichengreen and Vazquez 2000: 91-92; 
Toniolo 1998: 262). Despite this, two factors acted as accelerators of disposable income 
for the nascent European middle classes, offsetting the previously mentioned factor: the 
transfer of large numbers of agricultural workers to industry and services, where they 
received higher wages; and secondly, the steady increase in the proportion of skilled 
jobs. 2 The latter increase was particularly marked in France and Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, Sweden. 
When we turn to Spain, the economic policy of the Franco regime in its early years 
was characterized by two basic elements: suffocating interventionism and strict 
isolationism. As soon as the new regime came to power, it began introducing detailed 
regulations that conferred enormous discretionary power on the state bureaucracy, 
creating extensive de facto monopolies which relegated the market to a minor, 
supplementary position (Arco 2006: 245; García 1985: 136; Prados, Rosés and Sanz. 
2011: 46; Viñas 1980: 89). Isolationism was not so much a chosen economic policy as a 
much deeper ideological obsession. During this era all contact with the outside world 
was considered unpatriotic, and everything beyond Spain’s borders was identified with 
a general unspecified ‘enemy’ (Sanchís 2015: 260; Viñas 1980: 65). The new regime 
sought to control all aspects of daily life, managing the economy directly and isolating 
the country from the ‘contaminating’ outside world, a goal which culminated in the 
formation of an entity which strove to unite all state activities within the industrial 
sector. Its original name leaves no room for doubt about its underlying aims: El Instituto 
Nacional de la Autarquía – the National Institute of Autarchy.3 
The end result of this new policy was disastrous, sending the country into a deep 
depression unrelieved by the conclusion of World War II (Sánchez 2010: 339). With its 
GDP per capita falling sharply, the downward trajectory of Spain’s economy stood in 
marked contrast to the upward path of its neighbours (Maluquer 2009: 38-39; Pons and 
Tirado 2002: 18). Moreover, the drop in income, was not spread evenly among the 
                                                        
2
  The movement of labour away from the agricultural sector at a European level has been analysed by 
Temin, (2002: 11). The rise in qualifications of French workers is highlighted by Anderson, (2001: 104). 
3
  1941 saw the establishment of the Instituto Nacional de Industria, designed to be the keystone of the 
new state’s economic policy. In fact, this name was the result of a last-minute change, as its original label 
was ‘Instituto Nacional de la Autarquía’ (Gómez 2000: 28). 
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various sectors of society, but fell most severely on wage earners, who in many 
industries ended up with just 50% of their relative earnings prior to the Civil War (Vilar 
2004: 110). By contrast, the income of those with capital assets, land above all, rose 
substantially (Prados and Rosés 2009: 19). 
This economic situation started to improve slowly in 1950 when the regime found 
itself forced to rethink this isolationism, gradually gaining access to a more comfortable 
international position. The changes, however, were very slow up to 1959, when the 
Stabilization Plan was implemented. 1960 is the year in which Spain truly ceased to be 
a closed country, and set itself firmly on the road to economic growth (Sachs and 
Warner 1995: 25). 
It is common to point to three factors from 1960 on which helped Spain obtain the 
foreign exchange necessary to underwrite its accelerating economic growth: tourism, 
emigration and investment from abroad. Each of these had to overcome a range of 
political and legislative obstacles before becoming a factor in the national balance of 
payments. To begin with, thanks to the regime’s ingrained nationalism, it is hardly 
surprising that the Francoist authorities were bitterly opposed to emigration. Blocked at 
every turn, not until the 1960s were legal changes made to facilitate this (Fernández 
2005: 96). As for foreign investment, a severely restricting law was passed in 1939 
which led many foreign companies to abandon the Spanish market altogether, while 
also discouraging new investment (Álvaro 2011: 362). The relevant legislation was not 
modified until 1959. As a result, tourism was the only factor among the three previously 
mentioned to make significant contributions to the external financing of Spanish 
economic development prior to 1959. In addition, it continued to be the main element in 
the decade that followed, contributing 50% more foreign currency between 1960 and 
1970 than the other two sources combined (Sánchez 2006: 173). 
 
 
4. A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT FOR TOURISM 
 
With the end of the Civil War, Spanish tourism faced a particularly bleak scenario as it 
attempted to revive itself. But not only did World War II break out just a few months 
later, from the very outset the new regime manifested a special animosity towards the 
tourist industry. Franco himself, during his time as Military Commander of the Balearic 
 
Joan Carles Cirer-Costa 
 The Crumbling of Francoist Spain’s Isolationism Thanks to Foreign Currency 
Brought by European Tourists in the Early Years of the Golden Age  
7 
 
 
Islands between February 1933 and October 1934, had made his abiding distrust of 
foreigners quite clear. Back then he had instigated legislation which more or less 
implied that all tourists were little more than potential spies who should be strictly 
controlled and monitored, totally ignoring any economic benefit their presence might 
bring (Cirer 2009: 109). 
The Catholic Church, the regime’s fundamental pillar from the very outset, had 
already expressed its determined and explicit opposition to new habits and customs 
filtering into Spain which affected the dress and behaviour of Spanish women, 
especially in their leisure hours.4 In 1926 this subject led to the publication of one of the 
few pastoral letters issued by Spain’s archbishops back then, in which the impact of 
‘modern trends’ from abroad, and from France above all, was roundly lambasted. Later 
on, during the years of the Second Republic, continuous complaints were made at every 
level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy about perceived nakedness on Spanish beaches and 
the tolerance shown towards this by the civil authorities (Lannon 1999: 65). In other 
words, one of the most important institutions of the Franco regime had long declared its 
own private war on one of the most common manifestations of the new leisure tourism: 
enjoying the sun at the beach. 
As if that were not enough, the Falange, another of Francoism’s main buttresses in its 
early years, joined the anti-tourist crusade which seems to have constituted a key 
element in the new state’s moral ideology. Thus a Navarre newspaper proclaimed in 
September 1936: 
“Tourism must be replaced by the sacred military journey. The Falange will 
strictly prohibit, under severe penalties, tourism per se. Instead Spaniards will 
undertake journeys, resolved to conquer in a heroic (epic) manner. Sacred 
journeys, praying in Flanders, praying in Italy, praying in Germany. Military trips, 
fighting in France: the South against the North.”5 
 
As events show, these declarations of intent did not remain mere rhetoric, and were 
soon inspiring the legislation which emanated from the new state. Within a short time 
the focus of the authorities and law-enforcing bodies was on ‘re-Christianizing Spain’, 
an ideal that required its isolation from all sources of outside moral contamination 
                                                        
4 “Reparation was made to the Sacred Heart to atone for the offences offered to God by the world and, in 
the early twentieth century, these were strongly associated with immodesty and licentiousness” (Vincent 
2009: 243). 
5
 Text by García Serrano which appeared in the journal Arriba España, Pamplona, on 24 September, 
1936. This quote has been extracted from Estivill (1979: 177). 
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(Sánchez 1999: 167). In applying these new criteria strict police control was 
implemented on all foreigners who wished to travel through Spanish territory, assuming 
the form of ponderous and expensive bureaucratic procedures including a visa of 
previous entry with points of entry and exit, and the “triptych” (tríptico), a document in 
which all the tourist’s movements had to be recorded.6 This meticulous control extended 
to the hotel sector, which found itself obliged to fill out expensive and useless cards for 
police purposes (Fernández 1991: 472). 
Having once established its undisputed power in moral matters, the Church directed 
its efforts towards the repression of any vaguely sexual behaviour which lacked as its 
sole purpose procreation within Catholic marriage (Regueillet 2004: 1030). In line with 
this, a strict segregation of the sexes was imposed in public places, especially at beaches 
and swimming pools where, in addition, it was mandatory to use a bathrobe when 
entering and leaving the water, as well as a beach hut for changing in and out of 
swimwear (Iglesias 2008: 1357; Grup d’Estudi 2000). Classic examples of the fervour 
and missionary zeal surrounding such regulations are the ‘National Congress of 
Morality in Beaches and Pools’ (1951) and the ‘Association of the National Crusade for 
Decency’ (est. 1954), while the ‘Congress of the Spanish Family’ was still pressing in 
1958 to maintain segregated and strictly supervised beaches (Sánchez 2007: 212). 
So far we have looked briefly at ideological and moral issues, but three economic 
factors also deserve a mention, since they held back tourism in Spain and were a direct 
result of the Franco regime’s economic policy: the exchange rate, militant industrialism 
and all-pervading interventionism. Routine overvaluation of the Spanish currency 
became a governmental obsession, with every possible method being used to maintain 
this policy, resulting in a marked increase in the cost of travel to Spain (Prados et al. 
2011: 52). Between 1940 and 1948, the official peseta/dollar exchange rate was 11–13 
pesetas to the dollar, climbing to 25 pesetas/dollar in 1949, and reaching 40 
pesetas/dollar by 1951. The latter value underwent minor devaluation up until 1958, 
when it stood at 44 pesetas/dollar (Martínez 2003: 57). 
After the Spanish Civil War the Francoist state adopted a profoundly interventionist 
economic model which blurred the distinction between national economics and private 
                                                        
6
 The ‘triptych’ was a complicated and difficult document to fill in, which ceased to be required in 1952, 
except for tourists entering Spain in their own vehicles; in the latter case it remained in force until 1961 
(Vallejo 2014: 20). 
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businesses (García 1985: 142; Prados et al. 2011: 49). The position occupied by each 
economic sector in the regime’s mental framework had lasting consequences, as leading 
companies according to this vision were assured of ready access to whatever might be 
necessary for their subsistence and maintenance, whether imports, raw materials or bank 
loans. As Fraile Balbín comments: 
“Despite the all-embracing nature of this interventionism in every sphere – a 
pattern that has its parallel in another typical manifestation of state intervention, 
tariffs – interventionist rhetoric insisted from the outset on the vital importance of 
the industrial and mining sectors.” (Fraile 1998: 127). 
 
Tourism, of course, was not one of the industries to enjoy protection under the new 
regime, barred from the sort of bank-based funding monopolized by companies and 
sectors under official protection, e.g. the steel industry and railways. Being excluded 
from the protected sector had its benefits, however, as it was accompanied by a lack of 
interest or control from those supervising the state economy, so that tourist companies 
were left to manage their meagre resources as they thought fit (Cals 1982; Hernández 
and Mancha 1980; Ramon 2001). Thanks to its very nature, tourism required no foreign 
currency to operate, nor did it signify dangerous concentrations of workers and quotas 
of precious raw materials. As a result, it was barely affected by the ‘limiting factor’ 
which underlay the economic policy of the first Franco years (García 1985: 142). 
As might be expected, Francoist interventionism in its early years did have some 
impact on the hotel and catering industry. Regulations such as those of 1939 and 1944 
controlled business operations in minute detail, identifying scores of categories of 
establishment and hundreds of different types of employees. Other regulations forbade 
business contracts between Spanish hoteliers and foreign travel agencies (Esteve and 
Fuentes 2000; Fernández 1991). But of all the Franco regime’s interventionist measures, 
the most harmful was fixing maximum prices of hotel rooms, which failed utterly to 
take into account actual running costs. 
 
 
5. TOURISM IN SPAIN IN THE 1950’s: THE DATA 
 
In this section we will examine the data provided by the Spanish Statistical Office 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística or INE), to understand the pattern of tourism in Spain 
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during the 1950s. We begin our analysis in the year 1950, since that was when tourism 
returned to roughly the same level as 1935, the tourist influx being already very low that 
year as a result of the industry’s steady decline during the Second Republic (1931–36). 
1950 is also when the phenomenon of tourism began to be regularly reflected in the 
main statistical publication of that era, the INE’s Anuario Estadístico (Statistical 
Yearbook), which allows the phenomenon to be assessed quantitatively. In graphs 1 to 4 
we have summarized the main tourist data presented by the INE in its Yearbooks during 
the decade under question. 
The first diagram shows the numbers of foreign travellers arriving at Spain’s borders 
between 1950 and 1960, together with an estimate of the proportion of tourists, given as 
58% on average7. The graph’s gradient shows a rise we might call explosive: between 
1950 and 1960 the number of foreigners crossing Spain’s borders almost tenfolded, and 
within the general pattern three periods can be singled out. In the first, which covers 
1950 to 1953, the average growth was 134,000 foreigners per year, while in the second, 
between 1954 and 1959, it rose to 374,000 per year. Finally between 1959 and 1960 the 
increase comes close to one and a half million foreigners in just one year. This final 
surge is a leap of extraordinary importance which marks the end of one epoch and the 
beginning of another – hence the decision to end our analysis in 1959. 
  
                                                        
7
  This estimate for distinguishing between tourists and non-tourists is based on seasonal patterns for 
entries into Spain. By nationality, the estimates show that 70% of British, Dutch and Swiss arrivals in 
Spain were tourists, dropping to 57% for French arrivals. We believe this method tends to underestimate 
the proportion of foreign tourists in the total, giving a minimum figure for the volume of tourists entering 
Spain through its frontiers. 
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FIGURE 1 
TRAVELLERS ENTERING SPAIN, 1950–60 
 
Source: Based on data from the Anuarios of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1953–62 
 
FIGURE 2: 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRAVELLERS ENTERING SPAIN 
BY SEASONALITY AND NATIONALITY. 
 
Source: based on data from the Anuarios of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1931, 1934 
and 1955. 
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The timeframe of tourism shows a temporal growth which neatly matches the 
political evolution of Francoism in its early stages. As already mentioned, 1950 was the 
year in which tourism broke out of the marginal position it had occupied since the 
beginning of the Civil War, but it also coincides with the Franco regime positioning 
itself timidly on the international stage: ambassadors were returned to Western nations, 
traffic was resumed on the French border, and the first foreign currency loans were 
obtained (Torre 2011: 188). This allowed the regime to greatly reduce customs 
procedures, eliminate bureaucratic obstacles for internal travel, and substantially 
improve the exchange rate of the peseta for tourists. As a result, visitor numbers began 
to grow steadily. 
1953 is the year in which the dictatorship reached a reasonably comfortable position 
abroad, due to signed agreements with the United States and to the Concordat with the 
Holy See (Viñas 1980: 80; 2003: 84). The new political situation led to a rapid increase 
in tourist entries into Spain, as seen in Figure 1, i.e. from 1954 onwards. Finally, the 
abrupt tourist surge between 1959 and 1960 coincides with the Stabilization Plan, which 
brought a drastic devaluation of the peseta, Spain’s return to the international markets 
and the official end of the extreme autarchic policies. 
In Figure 2 we compare the final set of tourist data available for the pre-Civil War 
period and the earliest comparable set for the 1950s. With regard to nationality, it is 
worth underlining the drop in German and rise in North American tourism. The French 
maintain a clear leadership, followed by the British with numbers similar to twenty 
years earlier. Turning to seasonality, there is a radical turnabout, as can be seen in the 
second part of Figure 2. March, April and May had received the majority of tourists in 
1930, but these months now switched to being low season, with July and August the 
new boom months in 1954. This altered pattern provides clear evidence of entirely new 
interests for the visitors now streaming into Spain. 
In the 1930s, foreign visitors headed for the most part to the south in order to visit 
the cities of Granada, Malaga, Cordoba and Seville, drawn there by the various 
Orientalist myths; they either crossed Spain by rail from north to south, or else travelled 
by boat to the ports of Gibraltar or Malaga, doing so in the spring or autumn, only rarely 
in summer (Alonso 2009; López 2001; Valero 1991). Twenty years later visitors of this 
type still existed, but their presence was now diluted by the avalanche of avid sun and 
beach tourists arriving in the warmer months of the year. 
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FIGURE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRAVELLERS ENTERING SPAIN 
ACCORDING TO METHOD OF TRANSPORT. 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Anuarios of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1954–60. 
 
FIGURE 4 
PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ACCOMMODATION 
IN HOTELS AND GUEST HOUSES (PENSIONS). 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Anuarios of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1955–60. 
 
Joan Carles Cirer-Costa 
 The Crumbling of Francoist Spain’s Isolationism Thanks to Foreign Currency 
Brought by European Tourists in the Early Years of the Golden Age  
14 
 
 
The method of transport used by visitors (Figure 3) helps to confirm the previous 
point, namely that tourists in the 1950s were very different from those who had come in 
the 1930s, the disparity increasing steadily over time. In 1953, visitors arriving by road 
were already more than half of the total number, a figure which had risen to 70% by 
1959. Passengers arriving by boat and by train, clearly a majority in 1935, only grew by 
75% over those six years, while arrival at airports grew by 365%, and those crossing the 
border by car or bus rose by a factor of four. It should be said, however, that tourists 
arriving by boat increased more in quality than quantity, since the majority were 
Americans on cruise ships with very high purchasing power. It is estimated that in 1955 
about 115,000 American passengers used this route of entry (Cerchiello 2013: 160). 
The data presented above clearly show that tourist demand underwent remarkable 
growth between 1954 and 1959, which must have put tremendous pressure on the 
provision of accommodation. The statistics of the time show a rise of just 28% in tourist 
provision in Spanish hotels and pensions, a remarkably low figure that contrasts with 
the rapid growth of demand. The discrepancy indicates that there was a sizeable reserve 
of underused accommodation, which allowed most destinations to absorb the new 
customers without any major problems. But if we break down the increase 
geographically (15,765 rooms in total), it turns out that more than a third of the growth 
(5,660 rooms) was concentrated in just two provinces, the Balearics and Gerona, which 
doubled their tourist provision in five years. Given their special relevance, we will 
analyse in detail the tourist trajectory of these two areas in the section that follows. 
Figure 4 compares the evolution of these two provinces with Madrid, Barcelona, 
Guipúzcoa (a Basque province), and Santander, each of which had a long tradition of 
tourism and hostelry. It is clear from this that the tourist business was rapidly changing 
its patterns of geographical distribution, since Madrid and the two northern provinces 
grew by only 5.1% in these five years. The Mediterranean was clearly winning the 
game against the Cantabrian coast. 
When it comes to hotel category, change was minimal in the Spanish market as a 
whole, with the average hotel category going from 2.6 in 1954 to 2.7 in 1959. But 
behind this was a highly significant geographical distribution, with the average Balearic 
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category rising from 2.5 to 2.9 and that of Gerona from 2.2 to 2.48 .  Both these 
provinces experienced major growth accompanied by rise in quality, above all the 
Balearics. As might be expected, the new hotels were of higher quality than the 
previous ones. 
 
 
6. NEW MODES OF TRANSPORT FOR A NEW TOURIST MODEL 
 
The Spanish tourist boom of the 1950s would not have been possible without the 
improvement in Europe’s road network and the growing availability of private cars for 
the rising upper-middle classes. Following World War II, European governments, 
especially that of France, were concerned about repairing the railway network as 
quickly as possible, but the Marshall Plan modified this policy in practice by favouring 
the improvement of road links in accord with US economic planning. The improvement 
of European roads was accompanied by the rapid elimination of customs barriers for 
private cars and buses, since it was far easier for Europeans to agree to liberalize this 
type of traffic rather than that of goods (Schipper 2007: 221). 
One immediate result of this improvement was the development of tourist companies 
which used coaches as a means of transport. Although slower than trains, these were far 
cheaper and, more to the point, allowed great flexibility in the design of itineraries. In 
the 1950s a multitude of companies in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia offered 
‘all-inclusive’ trips to the European continent. The longest routes extended as far as the 
Costa Brava and Majorca, the latter including a necessary ferry transfer at the port of 
Barcelona (Kaiserfeld 2008; Walton 2011). 
When we turn to the car, this ceased to be a sign of affluence and became a central 
element in the lives of middle class Europeans, a process which began in Great Britain 
in the 1920s and spread to the continent in the post-War era (Cassamagnaghi et al. 
2010; Pope 2000). In France, clearly the key country in the present context, car 
ownership grew rapidly from 1949 onwards, when the country began to recoup lost 
ground vis-à-vis other European nations (Dezert 1965: 145). In 1953 two-thirds of 
                                                        
8
  The corresponding values employed are: Luxury hotels = 5-star, First A = 4-star, First B = 3-star, 
Second = 2-star and Third = 1-star. These values are not entirely comparable with current categories, but 
are useful for quantifying the average quality of hotels at the time. 
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French company managers and more than half the country’s businessmen and 
independent professionals already owned a car, and by 1960 a quarter of employees and 
workers had acquired this new consumer durable (Méot 2010: 110). 
We have already seen that the second method of transport which increased most in 
terms of foreigners arriving in Spain was the aeroplane (365% between 1950 and 1959). 
Here the phenomenon has two very different aspects: American tourism on the one 
hand, and European tourists attracted by sun and sand on the other. American tourism to 
Europe was actively promoted by the US government as a civilian adjunct to the 
political and military structure which grew out of the Cold War.9 In keeping with this 
general policy, the United States began to alter its attitude toward Spain: tourist contacts 
were resumed, and 1948 saw the inauguration of direct TWA flights between Spain and 
the United States (Vallejo 2014: 20). As the US already had its own prominent 
destinations for sun-and-sand tourism, American visitors to Spain were attracted by the 
myth of the Spanish south together with all its exotic features, abetted by an official 
propaganda that promoted a ‘Flamenco’ image of the country as a whole. 
To understand the connection between sun-and-beach tourism and air travel to Spain, 
we have at our disposal a number of analyses that cover the British and Swedish 
markets (Kaiserfeld 2008; Lyth and Dierikx 1994). In both cases the geographic 
element was essential, since the overland journey was long and arduous.  Aboard a DC3 
aircraft, however, a Briton could reach the Spanish costa in six or seven hours, while a 
Swede took twelve. Majorca was already the preferred destination, followed by the 
Costa Brava, the local airport in this case being Perpignan in French territory (Barbazza 
1988: 360). The first charter flights directed specifically to Spain can be dated to 
somewhere around 1952–53, from which point their growth was extremely rapid 
(Papatheodorou 2002: 383). Air transport did not in fact expand as fast as it might have 
done in the 1950s due to the slowness shown by the administration in building new 
airports capable of absorbing the growing traffic in tourists. Airports such as those of 
Ibiza, Gerona or Malaga were not built or adapted until well into the 1960s. 
 
 
                                                        
9
  “For U.S. policymakers, American travel abroad represented an economic and cultural tool that could 
help win the Cold War, a view also promoted by patriotic travel writers and by American business leaders 
in the international travel industry.” (Endy 2004: 2). 
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7. MAJORCA AND GERONA EPICENTRES OF THE TOURISM 
REVOLUTION 
 
Earlier on we mentioned that in the 1930s the island of Majorca had become the great 
tourist destination of the Spanish Mediterranean as it was included in global maritime 
networks, both those of cruise ships and others dedicated to the colonial traffic linking 
the great European metropolises with the rest of the world (Cirer 2014). As a destination 
it specialized in foreign visitors above all, with Catalan tourists as an additional extra. 
During the years of the Spanish Civil War, despite island tourism being reduced to 
zero, Majorca’s economy enjoyed a situation of relatively prosperity thanks to its 
diverse industry and modern agricultural techniques, capable of adapting to the new 
situation, at least at first. The smaller islands of Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera, by 
contrast, were plunged into a dismal spiral of poverty and isolation as they saw their ties 
with the outside world abruptly severed. The Majorcan situation worsened after the 
1940s, however, when industries for consumer products were no longer considered a 
priority by the new regime, and many Majorcan firms found themselves forced to close 
due to lack of supplies and spare parts. Inflation soared and there were serious food 
shortages (Ginard 1999). 
The grand hotels of Majorca all closed their doors for a time, and their flagship, the 
Grand Hotel de Palma, never reopened, its stunning Art Nouveau building mutilated 
and converted into offices. Smaller hotels and family pensions managed to remain afloat 
thanks to commercial travellers as the Majorcan economy slowly revived. From 1946, 
with other hotels reopening for newly married couples above all, the overall picture 
started to improve, helped by the reappearance of foreign tourists whose Majorcan 
vacation had once been part of an annual routine before the Civil War. 
1950 marks the end of the post-War period in tourist terms and the dawning of a 
whole new era in Majorcan tourism. In that year, more than 90,000 tourists stayed in 
Majorca’s hotels, 22,000 of them foreign (mostly French) and one third arriving by 
plane (Barceló 2000). The previous year saw the first incoming charter, a DC3 from 
Luxembourg, and Majorca’s airport at Son Bonet opened its first international route, 
Palma–Algiers, to which Palma–Paris was soon added. By 1950 the island’s entire hotel 
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industry was working at full capacity, and the first post-War hotel opened – the Maricel, 
a luxurious establishment of respectable size (Soriano 1996). 
Tourist numbers in the Balearics stabilized at around 180,000 between 1951 and 
1954, but in 1955 they began to grow again with the sudden influx of English, 
Scandinavian and German tourists, practically all arriving by plane. In that year there 
were already four foreign companies flying to Palma de Mallorca – BEA, Air France, 
KLM and Sabena – linking its airport with cities like London, Paris, Amsterdam and 
Brussels (Vives 2005: 218). The number of visitors from the Spanish mainland, which 
stood unchanged around the 60,000 mark, went from representing two thirds of arrivals 
in 1950 to less than a quarter ten years later. The French, while increasing their numbers 
in absolute terms, fell in relative standing from 19% to 12%. In 1959 more than half the 
tourists who came to the islands were Britons or Scandinavians who used aeroplanes as 
a means of transport. It should be noted that by this stage the Majorcan airport of Son 
Bonet was receiving three quarters of all charter flights coming into Spain (Pack 2009: 
157). 
Some of the tourists arriving in Mallorca in the 1950s were comparable to those who 
had done so twenty years earlier: owners of small- and medium-sized businesses and 
qualified professionals who wanted to ‘see’ things, touring the island during their stay 
and visiting places like the Serra de Tramontana (northern mountain range) and the 
caves of the southeast. But there were increasing numbers who adopted a far more 
stationary type of holiday, focusing their attention on the beach right in front of their 
hotel. 
The change of visitor interests was linked to the new tourist’s lower economic 
capacity, and led in turn to radical changes in the structure of the whole hotel business. 
This ‘industrialization’ process included the adoption of codes of conduct, increasingly 
standardized recruitment models and procedures, and a sharp focus on reducing costs. 
The Catalan entrepreneur Joan Riu was probably the first to redefine the tourist 
business with the overriding goal of achieving maximum economic efficiency. This 
hotelier, who arrived in Mallorca from Venezuela in 1953, purchased the San Francisco 
Hotel on Playa del Arenal in the Bay of Palma – a spot relatively isolated and 
unattractive by traditional standards. Here he began the first tourist business in which a 
foreign travel agency, the German firm of Dr. Tigges (which recruited tourists at place 
of origin and took care of charter transport) collaborated with a local establishment in 
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charge of accommodation. Every fifteen days a plane landed from Germany and 
unloaded its contingent of tourists before collecting the previous group, thereby 
reducing to a minimum costs of air transport, airport–hotel connection and hotel 
management expenses for arrival and departure of customers (Soriano 1996). 
The rapid implementation of this new tourist formula, focused on satisfying the 
demands of medium-level customers, explains the rapid take-off in international tourism 
on the Balearic Islands from 1954, and the explosion of available tourist 
accommodation between 1954 and 1959, when the number of rooms surged from 2,791 
to 6,276 according to data from the Spanish statistical office (INE). 
Apart from Majorca, tourism had also become firmly established in the 1930s on 
Ibiza, where between 1933 and 1935 a dozen hotels opened, providing almost five 
hundred beds in total and directing their efforts at an international clientele. All of them 
closed during the Civil War and reopened timidly after 1946 – with disastrous results: 
the lack of regular transport links to the mainland and the meagre supplies available to 
their kitchens made it impossible for a hotel of international standing to remain open 
(Planells 1984). It was only in 1950 that the situation began to improve with hotels on 
Ibiza recording their first acceptable post-War season. From then on the situation 
improved steadily. In 1954 6,650 foreign tourists arrived on the island, rising to 16,647 
in 1959. Growth still lagged behind what had been seen on the island of Mallorca, as 
Ibiza was unable to receive the new type of leisure tourist, lacking an airport open to 
international traffic. But this didn’t stop the island’s hotel infrastructure from expanding 
threefold between 1955 and 1960, amounting to 3,357 places (Ramon 2001). Ibizan 
entrepreneurs, like their Majorcan counterparts, had a firm belief in the potential of 
tourism and were willing to risk the scarce capital available to construct up-to-date hotel 
plant, comparable by the early 1960s to that provided in such long-established 
destinations as Santander or Malaga. 
We will now take a closer look at the most surprising case thrown up by the 
development of Spanish tourism: the explosive emergence of an ‘outsider’ resort – the 
Costa Brava in the province of Gerona. Here tourism developed at a vertiginous pace 
despite the absence of any previous tourist infrastructure, distinguishing this destination 
sharply from the Balearic Islands. In the latter we can trace the origins of the tourist 
industry to the end of the 19th century, with the result that Mallorca by 1903 and Ibiza 
by 1933 enjoyed splendid hotel facilities focused on international tourism. For the Costa 
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Brava, by contrast, the touristic background prior to the Civil War is notably scanty: a 
number of coastal holiday homes belonging to the middle classes of Barcelona and the 
provincial capital (Gerona), and a handful of hotels of modest dimensions. 
What makes the coastal area of Gerona stand out is its unique industrial past. 
Throughout the nineteenth century there had been a flourishing export industry 
dedicated to cork bottle stoppers, destined above all for France. Businesses were mainly 
small family affairs, similar in many ways to those now found in manufacturing parts of 
Italy (Becattini 2004: 19). Gerona’s cork industry had experienced a golden age in the 
years immediately prior to World War I, but had then followed a steady decline, 
plummeting into deep depression during World War II and the immediate post-War 
period, when foreign markets were taken over wholesale by Portuguese producers 
(Parsons 1962; Zapata 1996). 
Another unique element in tourism on Gerona’s coastline is that it has a very clearly 
defined beginning: the première of Pandora and the Flying Dutchman starring Ava 
Gardner and shot in Tossa de Mar (Cirer 2016; Molinas 1999). Released in 1951, this 
film brought the Costa Brava to the immediate attention of Europeans, and a number 
came down excitedly to see for themselves the landscapes and beaches that had made 
such a powerful impression in the cinema. This totally unexpected wave of pioneering 
visitors overwhelmed the meagre tourist facilities available in the area, and had a 
powerful ripple effect. Some of the new arrivals were journalists and writers whose own 
work contributed to the film’s publicizing effects, spreading the myth of the Costa 
Brava right around Europe in record time. The sight of crowded hostelries and tourists 
sleeping in their own cars after finding nowhere to stay prompted local businessmen to 
turn to tourism as a heaven-sent opportunity at a time of deep economic despair and 
depression (Mundet 2007). This particular business segment was poorly prepared, 
inexperienced in the tourist sector and with little access to serious funding. It was forced 
to improvise in the face of a demand that grew explosively by the year. But enormous 
economic benefits were gained, in spite of all this, and ploughed straight back into the 
industry, they ended up financing the establishment of a powerful local hotel sector 
(Cals 1982). 
The first wave of visitors on Gerona’s coastline were mainly Britons, who arrived by 
train and stayed in hotels, but these were soon eclipsed by the French who came by car 
(Besson 1964). In both cases, customers were of medium-high purchasing power in the 
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early years, but as the car became increasingly widespread among the French populace, 
the paradisiacal myth of the Costa Brava and low Spanish prices became the main draw 
behind this destination. The new type of tourist demand led to equally innovative 
provision, adapted to the factors of low budget and car availability, which crystallized in 
the appearance of newly built apartments and campsites. By 1960 the towns of Lloret, 
Platja d’Aro and Palafruguell were providing more than 13,500 places of these non-
hotel categories of accommodation (Barbazza 1988: 282). 
 
 
8. THE UNEXPECTED ROLE PLAYED BY TOURISM IN SPAIN 
 
In preceding sections we have seen how Europe’s tourist demand mushroomed, as well 
as the difficulties in developing adequate facilities to meet fast-rising demands among 
visitors to Spain, and also the growth of two leading tourist destinations that managed to 
overcome these problems. It is now time to recap and present an overview of tourism’s 
evolution in Spain between 1950 and 1959, and the first thing we must bear in mind is 
the country’s woeful political situation. The evolution of Francoism during this period 
was exasperatingly slow, the process of institutionalization from the end of the Civil 
War remaining sluggish, piecemeal and without vision (Thomas 1999). Back when the 
regime had yet to be consolidated, any change implied realignment of its powerful 
supporting social groups, which had meanwhile woven an intricate web of private 
interests into the autarchic ideal (Viñas 1980). If tourism managed to thrive under such 
inauspicious conditions, it was because of its peripheral nature for interests that 
perceived no inherent threat. As a result, when the tourist sector finally emerged with all 
its startling potency, it had already reached an irreplaceable position within the 
impoverished Spanish economy. 
Tourism in the 1950s was a peripheral activity in a double sense: on the one hand, 
economically speaking, it was completely removed from sectors that the Franco regime 
considered central to its sought-after industrial model of development; on the other, 
geographically speaking, it took place in two provinces which, according to the 
government schemes in Madrid, were of minimal importance. The regime devoted all 
its attention to large concentrations of manufacturing workers, ignoring what was going 
on in the Balearic Islands and Gerona, medium-sized provinces which in fact possessed 
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rich industrial and commercial traditions whose economic activity had always been 
channelled into economic sectors thought irrelevant to the Francoist industrial project. 
In both provinces the explosive growth of tourism appeared spontaneously, 
completely unconnected with the ‘economic planning’ of the regime, which sought to 
control all economic activity. The stifling nature of state control meant that ignoring 
existing tourist regulations was of the essence – far easier in places considered not 
worthy of attention by the regime’s hierarchy, i.e. Gerona and the Balearic Islands. It 
was thus possible for hoteliers to draw up contracts directly with foreign travel 
agencies, and use imaginative formulas to charge prices higher than those officially 
authorized (Cals 1982; Pack 2011; Vallejo 2014). 
In addition, the regime’s myopia with regard to what the 1950s tourist phenomenon 
actually signified helped it pass relatively unnoticed. Official propaganda concentrated 
its efforts instead on attracting upper-class visitors, supposedly eager for bulls, flamenco 
and castles, accommodating them in the rickety network of National Paradores 
(converted buildings of historic interest), in fact more suitable for receiving the regime’s 
hierarchy during provincial tours of inspection, rather than as an instrument of tourist 
development. 10  The reality was that for most foreigners crossing the border these 
traditional Spanish attractions, so highly valued by the regime, were of remarkably little 
interest. What they wanted was sun, beaches and fun (Storm 2013: 16). 
The importance of tourism in the Spanish balance of payments grew steadily from 
1947, and was firmly established as a vital element by 1954, when it exceeded a 
hundred million dollars (Martínez 2003: 38). Although this figure might not appear all 
that striking in absolute terms, in the context of a closed country which had drastically 
reduced all contact with the outside world, it was a sum of extraordinary significance. 
This was recognized in 1953 by one of the regime’s leading newspapers, Arriba, which 
called tourism “the most valuable national export” (Vallejo 2014: 22). Revenue from 
tourism grew much faster than anyone had anticipated, making it indispensable to the 
viability of the Spanish economy – and thus the survival of the regime itself, covering 
more than 80% of the Spanish trade deficit (Vallejo 2014: 27). In fact, it was the only 
source of foreign currency with real growth potential, as from 1953 on Spanish exports 
lacked any competitive edge (Martínez 2001: 246). 
                                                        
10
  In 1951 paradors were accommodating less than 10% of foreign visitors to Spain, a proportion that 
dropped rapidly in the years that followed (Pack 2009: 105). 
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The situation changed suddenly in 1955. Even though in that year tourist arrivals 
increased by almost 40%, the income generated from tourism, however, measured in 
dollars fell by 3% (Martínez 2003: 38). A disparity that showed not a simple statistical 
error, but that the black market for foreign exchange had reached macroeconomic 
proportions. The surcharges in hotel and restaurant exchange rates for tourists were now 
being diverted into channels that financed smuggling, extending rapidly throughout the 
Spanish economy just as the black market in food contracted. 
People had for some time been familiar with the figure of the ‘honest smuggler’ 
operating in the markets of Morocco, Algiers or the south of France, acquiring raw 
materials or spare parts for Spanish industries, and without whose existence firms 
would have been paralyzed due to the extreme inefficiency of official channels in 
acquiring essential currencies (Serrano and Asensio 1997: 555; Torre 2011: 195; 
Fernández 2012). Moreover, once the more pressing food needs of the Spanish 
population had been met, the demand for ‘modern’ consumer products like penicillin 
multiplied, far surpassing the meagre production capacities of autarchic Spain 
(González and Rodríguez 2013: 1). During the 1950s the country’s high demand for 
foreign currency knew no limits, and tourism became its main source. 
The problem of diverting tourist currency became increasingly serious. Between 
1954 and 1958, the number of foreigners entering Spain was multiplied by 2.5, while 
monetary income rose from 112 million dollars to just 85 million. The income gained 
from tourism fell by almost 75%, from over $100 per tourist to less than $25 (Martínez 
2003: 91). With surprisingly rapidity and efficiency, illegal networks for securing 
foreign currency extended their networks abroad, with tourists exchanging francs or 
pounds at source, arriving in Spain with their pockets already full of pesetas. As 
explicitly acknowledged by a report from the Ministry of Finance in January 1959,  
“the difference between the foreign and official exchange rates is significant [. . .] 
Last summer [1958] we found ourselves facing the scenario of all foreign tourists 
arriving with pesetas.” (Vallejo 2014: 25). 
 
Smuggling was probably a graver problem for the regime than the black market had 
been before, the latter a corrupt form of business managed by agrarian elites who 
supported Francoism (Gómez and Del Arco 2005). Smuggling, on the other hand, was 
based on social networks far older and traditionally opposed to the action of this or 
indeed any State. To combat it effectively the regime would have been obliged to resort 
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to a severe and wide-reaching campaign of indiscriminate repression which would have 
weakened its own social foundations and fragile international position, whilst also 
undermining the hesitant economic recovery. Nor was it feasible to oblige tourists to 
change minimum amounts of currency in Spain, a measure that had been in force years 
earlier and had finally been abandoned, since it would have harmed both tourism and 
the regime’s international prestige. 
Over the preceding years it had become clear that the main weakness of the Spanish 
economy lay in its inability to offer exportable products. This deficiency, together with 
the population’s extraordinary appetite for new foreign products and industry’s 
perennial needs to modernize, provoked a chronic imbalance of payments that in 1958 
led to a virtual suspension of wages. One must bear in mind that at the time remittances 
from emigrants were decidedly scarce, 6-7 million dollars per year, while imports of 
private capital were practically banned. In short, tourism appeared to be the only 
resource capable of providing enough foreign exchange to alleviate the desperate 
external situation, albeit in part (Martínez 2003: 124). Losing control of that source of 
foreign currency presented a serious threat to the survival of the regime. 
The tourist monetary fiasco actively contributed to the chronic deterioration of the 
external situation which pushed the regime against the wall and forced it to react. It had 
no choice but to initiate a comprehensive reform process that would allow it to regain 
control of the situation, even if that meant burying once and for all the autarchic ideal 
and yielding in the face of a strong devaluation of the peseta. The Francoist hierarchy 
was probably aware that their own survival was at stake, and therefore took up reform 
as an unavoidable lesser evil (Torre 2011).11 
  
 
 
  
                                                        
11 “Franco continued presiding over the impossible autarkic dream until 1959. He had no clue of how to 
modernize the Spanish economy. It was the clear and imminent danger of bankruptcy caused by the lack 
of foreign exchange which forced him to accept a change of direction. The Spanish economy and society 
modernized in the 1960s in spite of Franco, not because of him.” (Viñas 2017: 128). 
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